Legislature(2013 - 2014)HOUSE FINANCE 519
04/06/2013 12:30 PM House FINANCE
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| SB21 | |
| SB23 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| += | SB 23 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | SB 21 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | SB 18 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED |
CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 21(FIN) am(efd fld)
"An Act relating to the interest rate applicable to
certain amounts due for fees, taxes, and payments made
and property delivered to the Department of Revenue;
providing a tax credit against the corporation income
tax for qualified oil and gas service industry
expenditures; relating to the oil and gas production
tax rate; relating to gas used in the state; relating
to monthly installment payments of the oil and gas
production tax; relating to oil and gas production tax
credits for certain losses and expenditures; relating
to oil and gas production tax credit certificates;
relating to nontransferable tax credits based on
production; relating to the oil and gas tax credit
fund; relating to annual statements by producers and
explorers; establishing the Oil and Gas
Competitiveness Review Board; and making conforming
amendments."
12:36:04 PM
MICHAEL PAWLOWSKI, ADVISOR, PETROLEUM FISCAL SYSTEMS,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, concluded his sectional analysis
titled "Department of Revenue Sectional Review HCS CSSB
21(RES) April 5, 2013" (copy on file). The presentation was
initiated in an earlier House Finance Committee meeting. He
mentioned page 25, line 4 of the bill, referenced earlier
by Deputy Commissioner Balash. He noted that the Department
of Revenue (DOR) was using the "small d." The additional
test for the third part of the Gross Revenue Exclusion
(GRE) must prove to the Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) that the new acreage was geologically required for
expansion into the existing area and that industry could
account for the barrels. He recalled discussion about the
counting of the barrels. He saw the provision as an
opportunity to advance certain aspects of heavy oil
production. He added that geology versus artificial
definitions determined whether the oil was considered new.
Co-Chair Austerman referred to slide 10 of the
presentation: "For oil and gas produced north of 8 degrees
North latitude, the gross value at the point of production
is reduced by 20 percent for the oil or gas produced from."
12:39:00 PM
Co-Chair Austerman interpreted that 20 percent was reduced
from the 33 percent tax base. Mr. Pawlowski responded that
the production tax calculation utilized an equation
beginning with the price of a barrel of oil in the market
and subtracting the cost of transporting the oil to market,
which determined the gross value at the point of
production. The equation's value was then reduced by 20
percent in the provision. The cost of production was
subtracted to determine the production tax value.
Representative Gara asked if the 20 percent reduction as
defined in the bill equaled a 40 percent reduction in the
tax rate. Mr. Pawlowski replied that the price of oil
determined the tax rate. He noted that consultants would
present charts illustrating the effect between the varying
prices of oil.
Representative Gara clarified that the calculation of a 20
percent reduction in the tax rate was inaccurate. Mr.
Pawlowski confirmed that the reduction in the gross value
led into the equation for determining the tax rate.
12:41:12 PM
Representative Gara asked Mr. Balash about the oil
development planned under Alaska's Clear and Equitable
Share (ACES). He asked about the new oil incentive provided
to the projects, which he understood would incentivize
future events.
JOE BALASH, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, stated that the CD5 project was not yet
sanctioned. He noted that Umiat moved forward with drilling
to firm-up the productive capacity of the reservoir, but
was not sanctioned either. He stated that the Division of
Oil and Gas received plans of development annually. He
mentioned the development of the production forecast.
Distinguishing between new and old production required a
"bright line" to prevent quibbling. The department wished
to rely on established processes and tools.
12:44:34 PM
Representative Gara commented that ConocoPhillips was
planning to move ahead with CD5. He was unsure about
Oooguruk and Nakiachuk oil fields. He asked if those fields
would receive the new oil benefit under the legislation.
Mr. Balash replied yes. The legislation was crafted with
the awareness that Oooguruk and Nakiachuk would qualify.
Representative Gara disagreed with Mr. Balash about the
definition of new oil. He asked why new oil was considered
oil produced by 2011.
Mr. Balash responded that the dates indicated had changed
from version to version of the bill. He explained the
importance of granting the Production Area (PA), drilling,
and achieving production. The use of the date December 31,
2011 for a new participating area employed a process of
approval for a participating area and further development.
He was unaware of approvals of PAs that would have
otherwise qualified in the new unit category. He offered to
provide additional data and noted that the committee could
choose a different date if they wished.
Mr. Pawlowski stated that page 24, line 25 illustrated that
the identification of units formed after 2003. He stressed
that the benefit was in the future as opposed to one with a
retroactive application.
12:48:11 PM
Representative Gara recalled that "Representative
Fairclough's" statement that all oil would be new oil
eventually. The 20 percent GRE for old oil would affect
state revenues dramatically as a discount off of an already
reduced tax rate. He asked how much new oil would be in the
pipeline to produce a similar amount of revenue as the
current system.
Mr. Pawlowski replied that the provision had undergone
multiple revisions in the process. The House Resources
Committee refined the provision drastically because of
questions regarding new oil. He stated that DOR saw the
vast majority of Alaska's oil coming from areas that would
not qualify for GRE. He stated that a projection of
percentages was difficult to make. Consultants provided
analysis regarding the amount of oil that must be produced
over the long term to provide a break-even for the state.
The analysis assumed that every barrel was eligible for the
provision.
Co-Chair Stoltze clarified that Anna Fairclough was indeed
a Senator versus a Representative. Representative Gara
concurred. His recollection was that her statement about
new oil was made this year as a Senator.
12:51:49 PM
Representative Gara referenced the term "new geological
area" as stated in SB 21 when introduced by the governor.
The revised definition was at the discretion of the
Commissioner, which concerned him. He stated that companies
tended to be interested in expansion. He asked why the
definition for GRE was changed.
Mr. Balash responded that a timeline for the application
for GRE arose when the amount was established at 30
percent. At 30 percent, the time limit was discussed for a
provision with that level of impact on the overall tax
calculation.
12:56:08 PM
Mr. Pawlowski stated that the bill was a process through
multiple committees with policy calls developed through the
legislative process. When productivity declined on any
given oil well, the costs increased, which could lead to
inefficient economic results. The risk of creating
incentives was prematurely discontinuing a well's
production or drilling another well to gain the benefit of
GRE. He stated that qualifications of particular
productions and the gained benefit of GRE were addressed in
two categories; either a new unit or a new participating
area in an old unit. The third category attempted to
provide some measure of effect for the GRE to apply to
additions in the legacy fields to old PAs. He stated that
he could present a set of slides to illustrate the example.
Mr. Pawlowski added that the bill had been through a
collaborative process in multiple committees. The policy
regarding the extent of new additions in the legacy fields
was determined in the legislative process.
12:56:52 PM
Representative Holmes understood that the prior committee
added a "hard floor" of 4 percent to legacy oil, but not to
GRE new oil. She asked if the hard floor might be
applicable to GRE.
Mr. Pawlowski responded that new participating areas in
existing units were not economic. He added that expansions
were complicated and new units were clearly new. He
advocated for balance of the incentives to arrive at new
development. He noted that the timing for new development
happened in the future. He encouraged caution when
incentivizing new developments.
12:59:27 PM
Co-Chair Austerman asked for clarification about slide 10:
"Leases in a unit established after January 1, 2003." He
understood that application would be for two units only.
Mr. Balash replied that two currently producing units would
apply. Other units formed would eventually lead to
production.
Co-Chair Austerman understood that the slide applied to
units established after January 1, 2014. Mr. Pawlowski
concurred.
Co-Chair Austerman clarified that the indication was for
currently producing fields. Mr. Balash agreed that the two
fields, Oooguruk and Nakiachuk would be eligible for GRE in
2014 and after.
Co-Chair Austerman clarified that the detail was a policy
call. He asked about the impact on the bill if the
statement was removed. Mr. Balash wondered if the change
would include the application of GRE to all new
participating areas formed regardless of where or when the
unit itself was formed. If the second category was
preserved, then every participating area in new units would
qualify, but the two currently producing areas would not.
1:01:51 PM
Co-Chair Austerman planned to follow-up with the department
later.
Mr. Balash revisited the concern regarding the hard floor
and taxes expressed by Representative Holmes. Regarding the
newer areas on state land, the focus was on leases with a
one sixth royalty share. The royalty rates for the newer
areas were higher than the legacy royalty rates.
1:03:17 PM
Mr. Pawlowski discussed slide 11: "Lease Expenditures."
· Lease expenditures are ordinary and necessary cost of
upstream operations for exploration, development, and
production tax value. Currently lease expenditures are
allowed by regulation as required by AS
43.55.165(a)(1)(B)
· The bill restores 2006 language that allows Revenue to
consider JIBs that are substantially similar to
Revenue's definition of lease
Mr. Pawlowski explained that the slide covered sections 34-
36 in the bill found on page 26, line 3 through page 28,
line 29. The provision was added in a previous committee
and the attempt was to recreate language from previous
versions of tax legislation. The language directed DOR to
rely on audits performed by joint-interest owners via the
Joint Interest Billing (JIB) process. He stated that the
technical piece had an effect on how the department viewed
lease expenditures. He pointed out the dates listed in the
provision.
Co-Chair Stoltze asked which legislator proposed the
provision. Mr. Pawlowski replied that the changes were made
in the [House] resources committee.
Co-Chair Stoltze requested clarification regarding portions
of the bill that differed from the sponsor's intent.
1:06:10 PM
Mr. Pawlowski stated that section 34 began on page 26. He
noted that Legislative Legal made a technical correction
removing the date established by the provision. He stated
that the provision was created by an amendment offered by
Representative Hawker. He continued that page 26; line 23
was section 35, which ended on page 27, line 9.
Representative Gara asked about the section of the bill.
Ms. Pollard replied section 34, page 26.
Representative Gara discussed the strict auditing standards
in ACES. He opined that the provision minimized the state
overview of the costs deducted by the companies. He asked
how the provision might weaken the state's ability to audit
a company's costs and profits.
JOHN LARSEN, AUDIT MASTER, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ANCHORAGE
(via teleconference), replied that the prior committee's
amendments implemented the auditing standards that were in
place under the Petroleum Production Tax (PPT). He was in
the process of evaluating the legislation and whether the
use of JIB was necessary. The department had established a
set of lease expenditure regulations that would provide
transparency about deductible costs.
1:10:05 PM
Mr. Larsen explained that the regulations were developed
based on industry standards. He mentioned the Council of
Petroleum Accountants Societies (COPAS), which was an
educational organization dedicated to fair and equitable
accounting standards. He pointed out that industry
participated in COPUS. He was evaluating the bill to
determine the sponsor's intent regarding the auditing
requirements, and he intended to collaborate with DOL.
Mr. Tangeman added that Mr. Larsen provided the department
details regarding the information available to assist with
audits. He mentioned the department's access to JIB as a
tool for the provision. He noted that the document existed
between two companies. He highlighted the state's
responsibility to audit the taxpayer, and did not wish to
rely on JIB solely.
1:13:12 PM
Representative Gara asked if the department wished to
retain its existing auditing powers. He wondered if the
process might weaken the state's ability to detect costs
that should not be deducted.
Mr. Tangeman replied that the department had several
different tools, but using one exclusively might limit the
ability to use other valuable tools. He stressed that the
department required multiple resources to accomplish their
auditing job.
Co-Chair Stoltze remarked that he was confused about the
audit, but understood that the master auditor was also
struggling.
Mr. Tangeman emphasized that the department had access to
JIB and employed the tool in its auditing process.
Mr. Pawlowski clarified language on page 26, line 14 and
page 27 lines 18 through 19. He highlighted that the costs
were not prohibited under (e) of the section, which were
costs defined as items that were not lease costs.
1:15:49 PM
Representative Holmes asked if the provision would reduce
the available amount of information for auditors.
Mr. Tangeman responded that the provision might redirect
the department to one specific document as opposed to the
plethora of information provided in ACES.
Vice-Chair Neuman understood that the department would
receive less information with the provision. He wished to
see the language that was removed or replaced by the new
provision.
Mr. Tangeman responded that the parameters addressed in
2006 provided new territory at ACES's implementation. The
department had access to much more information under ACES.
He stated that multiple sources of information were relied
upon to complete the auditing process.
1:19:09 PM
Mr. Tangeman stated that a reference to 2006 was
unwarranted, because the department had a better
understanding of options in 2013.
Mr. Pawlowski stated that 15 AAC 260(d) described the
process used to determine lease costs when multiple owners
were involved in a field.
Mr. Tangeman added that the department had implemented over
70 regulations in order to proceed in the audit process.
Vice-Chair Neuman commented that DOR received ample funds
for the purpose of updating programs needed for the
auditing process.
1:21:29 PM
Mr. Pawlowski discussed slide 12: "Other Key Provisions."
He mentioned Section 42 on page 30, line 27, which was an
amendment, added in the resources committee by
Representative Seaton.
· Allows the Alaska Industrial Development and Export
authority to issue bonds for an oil processing
facility and to establish an oil and gas
infrastructure fund.
Mr. Pawlowski explained that the language provided a
mechanism through which the legislature could appropriate
funds for financing and construction of oil and gas
infrastructure.
Co-Chair Stoltze asked if a pipeline to the peninsula might
be hypothetically funded with the mechanism.
Representative Costello requested a summary of the
competitiveness review board in the previous version of the
bill.
Representative Gara pointed out line 3 and the reference to
gas processing facilities and relating pipelines. He
understood that a new producer might acquire financing to
build their own processing facility.
Mr. Pawlowski concurred and directed members to section 47,
page 31, line 28. He explained that the section addressed
bond authorization language for AIDEA. The section
established the fund in AIDEA and authorized the issuance
of the bonds to begin the financing of a facility.
Representative Gara stressed the importance of enabling new
producers financing for processing facilities. He heard a
rumor about a 10 percent interest rate for such financing.
Mr. Pawlowski could not comment on a financing agreement.
Mr. Pawlowski stated that the 10 percent estimate provided
an opportunity. He reminded members about past investment
in a facility that neglected to produce much oil. The
interest rate was entertained as an opportunity for the
state to partner and participate in the creation of
targeted facilities.
1:26:16 PM
Mr. Pawlowski pointed out page 28, line 31, which provided
the description of the surface infrastructure. The
provision discussed the competitiveness review board as an
update to AS 43.55.180(b). The update was a direction to
DOR to prepare a report analyzing the effect. The reporting
provisions were put in place in 2006 when tax laws were
revised. The department was required to review the various
credits and issues identified in the sections and provide a
report back to the legislature on the effectiveness. The
due date for the report was before the first day of the
2016 regular session of the legislature. The amendment was
made to the existing reporting provision, which expired on
page 29, line 1 in 2011.
1:27:53 PM
Representative Costello requested a description of the
previous version's "competitiveness review board."
Mr. Pawlowski replied that the competitiveness review board
had the goal of depoliticizing the conversation of oil and
gas competitiveness as modeled by Alberta. He explained
that a board would be created to review the competitiveness
issues in the state with a focus on taxes, infrastructure,
regulatory environments and labor and workforce
availability. The goal was an ongoing look at what was the
most important industry from a state revenue perspective.
1:29:33 PM
Representative Edgmon requested an interactive model to
help understand the moving parts of the bill.
Co-Chair Stoltze noted the request for colorful charts.
Representative Edgmon requested a summary analysis of what
the bill might produce as far as fiscal impacts and
scenarios of an increase of the revenue curve. He
referenced similar charts during ACES deliberations.
Co-Chair Stoltze offered to work on the logistics of the
requested presentation. He expressed interest of the
parameters expected.
Representative Edgmon asked the administration for a
summary analysis of what the bill might produce within a
five or ten year period. He stated that increasing the
revenue curve was of interest to him. He wished to know the
fiscal impacts of the legislation. He stressed that the
bill's intentions were to raise the revenue curve. Co-Chair
Stoltze noted that the revenue curve would increase with
the production curve.
Mr. Pawlowski appreciated the committee's engagement. He
stated that the consultant's presentation would provide the
requested information. He stressed that the initial plan to
equalize production. Co-Chair Stoltze stated that time was
limited.
Representative Gara requested that the model include some
level of lever allowing data from progressivity at
different prices.
1:34:19 PM
Mr. Pawlowski discussed slide 13: "Summary."
Four principles:
Tax reform that is fair to Alaska
To encourage new production.
Simple and balanced system
Competitive for the long-term
1:36:03 PM
AT EASE
1:54:41 PM
RECONVENED
BARRY PULLIAM, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ECON ONE RESEARCH, INC.
provided a brief history about himself. He provided a
PowerPoint presentation "ACES, SB21/HB72 and HCS CSSB
21(RES) CS SB21 (RES) for House Finance Committee (copy on
file)."
Mr. Pulliam explained that he had worked with Alaska since
the late 1980s on issues involving royalties, tax and
gasline forecasting. He stated that the majority of his
work was done on behalf of the administration, but he had
also worked as a consultant for Legislative Budget and
Audit (LB&A). He worked for other states as well such as
California, Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma and had worked
for the Federal Trade Commission in the Department of
Interior. He noted history working with oil refiners and
gas and oil processors in both the Lower 48 and in Alaska.
1:58:25 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 2: "Key Features of ACES,
SB21/HB72 and HCS CS SB21 (RES)" He mentioned the operation
of the tax system in Alaska under ACES.
Co-Chair Stoltze requested that Mr. Pulliam delineate the
section referenced throughout the presentation.
Mr. Pulliam continued with slide 2: "Key Features of ACES,
SB 21/HB72 and HCS CSSB 21(RES)." He began by discussing
production tax in Alaska. Prior to ACES, tax was based on
the gross value of the oil. In 2006, PPT was adopted, which
was modified in 2007 to ACES. He noted that ACES moved from
a tax on the gross value to a tax on the net value of the
oil. He explained that SB 21 also taxed the net value as
opposed to the gross value. He noted that ACES had a 25
percent base rate and a progressive tax when the net value
of the oil rose above $30 per barrel and tapered off at $92
per barrel. The maximum rate would be 25 percent base and
50 percent progressive. He explained that ACES had a tax
credit system that provided 20 percent of qualified capital
expenditure. A company that spent $100 million in capital
would get $20 million refunded in taxes. He noted the
absence of GRE in ACES. He added that ACES had a minimum
tax of 4 percent when west coast prices were over $25 along
with a small producer credit.
2:02:55 PM
Mr. Pulliam continued with the second column on slide 2.
The second column was titled "SB71/HB72" and depicted the
bill as introduced. The base tax rate remained the same at
25 percent. The progressive portion of ACES was removed,
leaving the maximum tax rate at 25 percent. The credit
system was removed. A GRE was included for new units and
PAs, which reduced the value of the oil in the tax
calculation.
Co-Chair Stoltze noted that the reference to SB 71 in the
column was incorrect, since the bill in committee was SB
21. Mr. Pulliam agreed. He continued that companies that
did not have a tax obligation could carry forward losses
and increase at 15 percent a year. The process differed
from the monetization in ACES. The minimum tax remained the
same. The small producer tax credit was extended to 2022.
Mr. Pulliam continued with slide 2 and the third column
"HCS CS SB21 (RES)." The 25 percent rate increased to 33
percent. No progressive tax above the 33 percent and
credits were reintroduced in the form of a per-barrel
credit. He noted two credit systems, one for those that did
not qualify for GRE and another for barrels that did
qualify for GRE. He noted that GRE remained at 20 percent
and was applied to new units and PAs as well as PA
expansions. The monetization of net operating losses was
reintroduced. The gross minimum tax remained applicable for
volumes that did not qualify for GRE (legacy production).
2:06:59 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 3: "Tax Calculation Under
ACES." He stated that taxes under four different tax
scenarios were used for the demonstration. He began with
$100 per barrel leaving a gross value of $90 per barrel.
Production costs were then subtracted to arrive at the net
value of $60 per barrel, which is what the tax would be
based on. He pointed out the base tax of 25 percent and the
progressive tax of 12 percent, based on the net value. The
total tax rate was 37 percent in the example or $22.20. A
$3 credit was offered, since $15 was spent in capital,
which reduced the tax level to $19.20.
2:09:44 PM
Co-Chair Stoltze asked if the chart applied to the
production tax. Mr. Pulliam replied that the chart referred
to the production tax alone. Other components would be
addressed further along in the presentation.
2:11:08 PM
Mr. Pulliam explained that the last two rows on slide 3
depicted the effective tax rate on the net value and the
gross value of the oil. In the example provided, the
effective tax rate on net value of the oil was 32 percent.
2:12:06 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 4: "Tax Calculation Under ACES:
Varying Costs." The slide depicted variations using a
constant $100 per barrel price. The variables in the chart
were the operating costs and capital expenditures. He noted
that the increase in costs reduced the progressive tax rate
and increasing the credit with the additional capital.
Ultimately, the 32 percent rate was reduced to 25 percent.
When costs were reduced, tax rates increased.
2:13:31 PM
Mr. Pulliam explained that when the cost of production
increased, the net value and tax rate decreased. He added
that a new development can also reduce tax on the barrels
producing.
2:15:11 PM
Representative Gara pointed out page 4, lines d and e,
where the lower production costs gave a higher tax rate.
Mr. Pulliam replied that he was not suggesting that the
idea was bad. He agreed that the feature was part of the
design. He suggested that the incentives for efficiency
were eliminated by the feature.
2:17:32 PM
Representative Gara offered that ACES was designed to allow
for greater profits with the higher tax rates. Mr. Pulliam
agreed that the profits would increase marginally at a
diminishing rate.
Representative Gara questioned the notion that a company
might avoid spending efficiently to avoid a higher tax
rate. Mr. Pulliam replied that the feature of ACES muted
the normal incentive for efficiency. He mentioned the
practice of viewing investments as "economic" because of
the ability to buy a tax rate down. He mentioned that the
incentive to produce a high-cost field could be made to
look economic in the system. The funds would come from the
reduction in taxes.
Representative Gara understood that ACES attempted to
incentivize projects.
Mr. Pulliam stated that he was not complaining. He
questioned the effect of the "incentive" on the industry.
2:21:07 PM
Vice-Chair Neuman asked what components would increase
capital expenditure (Capex) and operating expenditure
(Opex). Mr. Pulliam responded that the price on the west
coast was the same. He explained that the different fields
on the North Slope had different cost structures. He added
that different cost structures could be found on a given
field. He pointed out that operating in another geological
area with distance to facilities could increase or decrease
costs.
2:23:05 PM
Vice-Chair Neuman understood that buying down the Capex an
Opex increased the net value. Mr. Pulliam concurred. As
costs decreased, the progressive rate increased under ACES.
2:23:48 PM
Representative Costello asked about slide 2. She understood
that the comparison of tax regimes showed that both SB 21
and ACES allowed industry the ability to buy down the tax
rate.
Mr. Pulliam responded that the price rates illustrated
lower tax than the maximum rate. He offered to provide
comparisons between ACES rates and those of HCS CS SB
21(RES), to enable the committee to view the differences.
Representative Costello wished to motivate companies to
invest and produce in Alaska by manipulating the tax
structure. She asked for further explanation of the purpose
of a fixed dollar per barrel credit. She stated that the
assumption when creating ACES was that the credits provided
for investment would provide the motivation required.
2:26:40 PM
Mr. Pulliam responded that ACES provided a 25 percent
capital credit and spending more money allowed for a
reduction in the tax credit. The system with the per-barrel
credit was simpler to apply for industry. The marginal tax
rate of 33 percent was consistent and the credit was tied
to the oil produced in HCS CS SB 21(RES). He opined that
the predictability of HCS CS SB 21(RES) was more difficult
to model in ACES.
Representative Costello asked why the loss/carry-forward
percentage and the base tax rate were the same. Mr. Pulliam
explained that parity was provided by the net operating
loss credit for someone who was not paying taxes. A higher
rate would introduce inefficiencies and a lower rate would
skew the economics of the project making it less
attractive.
2:30:15 PM
Representative Wilson pointed to slide 4. She noted that
difficult-to-capture oil yielded $12.50 in tax paid to the
state per-barrel of oil. She opined that ACES would yield
less money in the long run because of the difficult-to-
process oil in the legacy fields.
Mr. Pulliam agreed and noted that the higher the costs to
the industry the lower the effective tax rate for the
state. When the price of oil is lower, and the operating
and capital costs remain high, then the effective tax rate
is lower still. The ACES tax rate was both a function of
price and costs.
Representative Wilson asked if the state would yield the
same revenue under HCS CS SB 21(RES) as in ACES.
Mr. Pulliam responded that the revenue would have been
similar under the governor's version of SB 21 when oil was
at $100 per barrel.
2:32:37 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 5: "HCS CSSB 21(RES) Per-Barrel
Credits Non-GRE Volumes (Stepped Scale) v. GRE Volumes
(Fixed)." The chart displayed the two different credits in
HCS CS SB 21(RES). The "stepped scale" started at $8 per
barrel and phased out as prices increased and applied to
non-GRE eligible volumes. The "fixed $5" credit applied to
the GRE eligible volumes. The effect of either credit would
make the 33 percent tax rate slightly progressive.
2:34:52 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 6: "Tax Calculation Using
Stepped Scale production Credit (Volumes Not Subject to
Gross Revenue Exclusion)." The chart provided an example of
how the tax would work. The tax was shown for barrels that
were not subject to GRE. The column with the box
illustrated the $100 per barrel calculation. The effect of
the tax credit lowered the tax rate from 23 percent to 15.3
percent. In the example, the percentage of the gross value
was approximately 15 percent. The effective tax rate would
top-out at 33 percent by phasing-out the credit.
2:36:59 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 7: "Effective Tax Rates under
HCS CSSB 21 (RES) (Volumes Not Subject to Gross Revenue
Exclusion.)" The graph displayed the tax rates discussed in
the previous spreadsheet. The solid line on top showed the
effective tax rate on the net value of the oil. The dashed
line showed the tax, as a percent of the gross value.
2:38:05 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 8: "Tax Calculation Using Fixed
$5 Production Credit (Volumes Subject to Gross revenue
Exclusion)." The 20 percent GRE was calculated in the
chart. The GRE reduction allowed for fewer taxable dollars.
For oil at $100 per barrel, the effective tax rate on the
net value was 14.8 percent and 9.8 percent on the gross
value. The credit was fixed at $5, but the value of the
credit dropped as the price of oil increased.
2:40:14 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 9: "Effective Tax Rates under
HCS CSSB 21 (RES) (Volumes Subject to Gross Revenue
Exclusion)." The slide showed the net and gross rates over
the price range. He noted that the barrels did not have the
4 percent gross tax floor, so the tax rate would be reduced
to zero.
Representative Costello asked about slide 8. She understood
that the purpose of the legislation was to address new
fields and units. She asked why the chart showed static
lease expenditures. Mr. Pulliam responded that the chart
allowed a comparison of the different tax rates, using the
same cost assumptions.
Representative Gara discussed the calculations that
utilized the GRE for new fields. He noted that the 20
percent GRE equated to a 40 percent reduction in tax. Mr.
Pulliam replied that without the GRE at $100 per barrel a
23 percent tax rate was calculated while the GRE yielded
approximately 15 percent.
Representative Gara replied that the GRE allowed a 40
percent reduction in tax. Mr. Pulliam concurred, but
admitted that he had not performed exact calculations.
Representative Gara requested exact calculations.
2:43:47 PM
Representative Gara pointed to slide 9 and asked if the tax
rate took credits and other deductions into account. Mr.
Pulliam concurred.
Mr. Pulliam answered Representative Gara's previous
question with 35 versus 40 percent tax reduction.
2:45:22 PM
Representative Gara asked if the state would be protected
with the GRE in the event of the discovery of a large
field.
Co-Chair Austerman questioned the fairness of the question
that would be decided by the administration or the
legislature.
Representative Gara thought that the tax rate should be
higher for larger, more profitable fields.
Mr. Pulliam stated that he did not have a conceptual
problem with a larger field encountering a higher tax rate,
but a fair share was not an economic concept. He stated
that finding a larger field was unlikely.
2:49:00 PM
Vice-Chair Neuman opined that a larger field had more value
because it would last longer. He stated that the production
tax would level out within five years but the corporate tax
would increase leading to greater profit for the state. Mr.
Pulliam agreed that larger fields yielded additional
benefits. He opined that finding a large field would be
wonderful for the state, but he did not believe that the
state had large fields to offer.
2:50:25 PM
Representative Costello asked if fields that applied for
the GRE required greater lease expenditures because of the
structure. She questioned the comparison offered because
the lease expenditures for fields with GRE were the same as
existing fields. She thought that the purpose of the
comparison was to illustrate the difficulty and cost
related to new oil exploration and production. She wished
to see other lease expenditures listed in the calculation
of the effective tax rate.
Mr. Pulliam explained that varying lease expenditures were
provided in his presentation. He stated that the cost of
production for legacy fields was lower because investments
were already made. He noted that legacy fields required
ongoing investments, which were sometimes equivalent to
development costs in the new fields.
2:52:59 PM
Representative Costello heard that the natural decline rate
of the fields would be 15 to 20 percent. Mr. Pulliam
replied 15 to 20 percent decline rate without any further
investment. The decline rate was stemmed by continued
drilling in the fields.
2:54:03 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 10: "State, Federal and
Producer Take at Various $2012 WC ANS Prices for All
Producers (FY 2015-FY 2019) ACES and HCS CSSB 21(RES)." The
graph depicted a comparison of state, federal, and producer
take. The graph showed the amount of money after costs the
government or producers received.
Co-Chair Stoltze asked if royalties were counted in
"government-take." Mr. Pulliam replied yes. Even private
royalty was calculated.
Co-Chair Stoltze asked if the terms listed were "general
nomenclature."
Mr. Pulliam concurred and explained that Alaska had public
land primarily, so the royalties went to the government. He
noted that in slide 10, the green bar depicted the state
take. The graph included royalties, production tax, income
tax and property tax. He added that ACES, because of
progressivity allowed for increases in the state take, but
reductions in the federal in producer take when the price
of oil increased. The bottom section of the chart showed a
graph depicting the same data under HCS CSSB 21(RES).
2:58:29 PM
Representative Edgmon asked if producer take was the
equivalent of producer profit. Mr. Pulliam replied that the
terms were similar in concept. He noted that the "take"
included the cash flows, while "profit" was largely an
accounting measure.
2:59:05 PM
Mr. Pulliam detailed slide 11: "Average Government-take for
All Existing Producers (FY 2015-FY 2019)." The chart
provided different iterations of the bill along with ACES
and the varying government-take using prices of $60 per
barrel to $160 per barrel.
3:01:03 PM
Mr. Pulliam noted slide 12: "Average Government-take for
All Existing Producers (FY 2015-FY2019) ACES v. SB21/HB72,
CS SB 21 (FIN) and HCS CSSB 21(RES)." The graph depicted
the information shown on slide 11. The red line illustrated
government-take for ACES, while the green line illustrated
HCS CSSB 21(RES).
3:02:26 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 13: "Effective Tax Rates on
Gross Value for Legacy Production ACES vs. SB21/HB72, HCS
CSSB 21(RES) and Other Large Oil-Producing States with
Production Taxes at $100 Wellhead Value." The chart
differed in illustrating the effective tax rate after
deductions and credits.
3:02:54 PM
Mr. Pulliam detailed slide 14: "Effective Tax Rates on
Gross Value for Legacy Production ACES vs. SB21/HB72, HCS
CSSB 21(RES) and other large oil-producing states with
production taxes at $100 wellhead value." The comparison
showed that the taxes in Alaska were higher than other
states. The graph used volume and cost from the past year
and compared data to other producing states in the country
that utilize a gross tax system.
3:04:17 PM
Vice-Chair Neuman asked about the effective tax rate on the
chart. He asked how the chart would look if the federal
take was subtracted and the state take was visible.
Mr. Pulliam replied that the tax shown in the chart was
simply production tax. He explained that the chart required
royalties and income tax to show total state take, which
would make the ACES rate even higher. The new calculation
would bring HCS CSSB 21(RES) into an even place with the
other states on the graph.
3:06:12 PM
Co-Chair Austerman asked about slide 12 and the variance
shown for HCS CSSB 21(RES) in the graph. He asked if the
variance was due to new or old oil. Mr. Pulliam replied
that the data would vary according to companies' specifics.
The graph provided an aggregate across all producers, based
on the forecast over the next several years. He added that
the data illustrated primarily non-GRE oil.
3:07:09 PM
Representative Holmes asked about slide 14. She assumed
that lower prices would change the data. Mr. Pulliam
concurred and stated that at a lower price level, Alaska's
tax rates would decline, while the other states would
remain static.
3:08:43 PM
Representative Kawasaki asked about slides 10 and 12. He
asked about the graph on slide 10, under ACES at $100 per
barrel, the take was approximately 20 percent while HCS
CSSB 21(RES) was greater than 20 percent. Mr. Pulliam asked
if Representative Kawasaki was referencing the federal
take. Representative Kawasaki concurred. Mr. Pulliam agreed
with the assessment. He noted that the federal government
was a claimant on profits after the state. The federal
government tax rate was 35 percent, with deductions allowed
for the cost of operations, royalties, severance as well as
income taxes. As the state's severance taxes increased, a
lower tax base was available for the federal government.
Representative Kawasaki asked if the federal government
received more money when the state taxed less. Mr. Pulliam
replied yes. If a company was a dollar more profitable,
then 35 percent would go to the federal government.
3:11:08 PM
Representative Kawasaki pointed to slide 12. He observed
that the state would not benefit from low or high prices of
oil with HCS CSSB 21(RES). Mr. Pulliam agreed that the
range was narrower with HCS CSSB 21(RES) than ACES. He
pointed out that upon the inception of ACES, prices of $60
per barrel were considered high. He stated that the gross
floor kicked in at $25 per barrel.
Representative Gara pointed to slide 10. He observed that
the state's share increased as prices increased under ACES.
The producer's overall profit increased in tandem. Mr.
Pulliam agreed that profits increased under ACES but the
margin decreased. He added that profits in other state's
tax structures increased at a more dramatic rate due to
their lack of progressivity. The industry finds those
profits much less attractive.
Representative Gara stated that reducing taxes by $1
billion, then $350 million would go to the federal
government and the other $650 million would go to the
industry. Mr. Pulliam concurred, but added that the state
would benefit from income taxes.
3:15:35 PM
Representative Gara stated that the state income tax was
only 9 percent. Mr. Pulliam replied that he used 6.5
percent for his calculations.
Representative Gara understood the government-take numbers
but he believed the profitability numbers would be useful.
He understood that the profitability rate was higher than
most fields in the Lower 48.
Mr. Pulliam stated that a field where an investment had
been made in the past would see higher profitability than
an area requiring investments. The new investments provided
the greatest challenges.
3:17:39 PM
Representative Gara understood that cost for higher profits
existed. He asked whether the profitability of the state's
legacy fields ranked highly in comparison to other
locations. Mr. Pulliam disagreed because the other
locations would also have old investments with lower takes.
3:19:40 PM
Mr. Pulliam pointed to slide 15 titled "Summary of
Investment Measures for New Participant 50 MMBO Alaska Oil
Development ACES and HCS CSSB 21(RES) v. Benchmark Areas."
He noted that previous committees performed ample analysis
comparing production with capital investment in Alaska and
elsewhere. Profitability and investment metrics were also
observed for new investments in Alaska relative to other
states.
Mr. Pulliam directed attention to the left side of the
slide related to West Coast ANS price. The assumption used
a new 50 million barrel field that cost approximately $1
billion to develop. The chart compared ACES and HCS CSSB
21(RES) using two different royalties with regimes in other
parts of the world. He used a profitability index and
explained that the greater numbers were better. The
internal rate of return represented a calculation of a
certain return established by a company.
3:23:43 PM
Mr. Pulliam continued to address slide 15. Raising the tax
rate could increase the Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
because of the buy-down effect. He cautioned that IRRs at
100 percent did not necessarily mean they were better than
lower IRRs. The final column related to government-take. He
noted that the ACES column was in a 70 percent range. The
state's take was shown in the net present value (NPV). As
present value went up for producers the state take went
down. He mentioned items that a producer would consider all
aspects of the information provided in the slide along with
the geology, stability and other opportunities involved in
the investment. He compared column 1 to column 3 and the
differing net present value, which was significantly higher
under the proposed legislation than under ACES.
Mr. Pulliam further discussed the GRE that was
significantly higher in HCS CSSB 21(RES) than under ACES.
The government-take would drop with a $100 barrel of oil
price. He discussed non-Alaska projects modeled. He
mentioned stability, geopolitical items, and other issues.
The HCS CSSB 21(RES) version was generally attractive in
comparison with the non-Alaska projects.
3:27:57 PM
Mr. Pulliam stated that the economics were standalone with
the perspective of a new participant. He explained that
the data was presented in the form of incremental economics
from the standpoint of an incumbent. The chart incorporated
the buy-down effect discussed earlier. Under ACES, the NPVs
were higher because of the benefit of tax reduction on
existing production. He pointed out the cash margins under
ACES in column 1, where a $40 increase in price yields $8
for the producer. For HCS CSSB 21(RES) in column 3 the same
comparison increased from $23 to $39, meaning that the
producer would keep a larger share of the upside as prices
increase.
3:30:28 PM
Mr. Pulliam turned to slide 17 titled "State Support for
Capital Spending Under ACES and HCS CSSB 21(RES) at $100
West Coast ANS ($2012)." The graph depicted the differences
in systems regarding the state's assistance in upfront
development. He pointed out the third bar in the graph and
explained that the state would participate by 45 percent
through credits and purchase of the Net Operating Loss
(NOL). Under the ACES "new participant" category, when the
producer spent $1 billion, the state would issue credits of
$450 million. An incumbent, displayed in the second bar
received the benefit of reducing taxes on existing
production, which amounted to an additional 60 percent of
the cost of new spending covering approximately 80 percent
of the capital spending.
Mr. Pulliam pointed to the right side of the bar graph
depicting the effect of the proposed legislation. Both the
new participant and the incumbent would receive 33 percent
in either tax reduction or NOL credits.
3:33:36 PM
Co-Chair Austerman asked about slides 15 and 16. He
interpreted that Alaska would have lower government-take
than the other areas listed. He anticipated that his
constituents would question the decision.
Mr. Pulliam replied that chart addressed new production
opportunities. He opined that government-take was not the
most important metric when determining whether a project
would get sanctioned. He suggested a comparison with Eagle
Ford which showed a 68 percent government-take with a
higher NPV. He noted that the investment in Eagle Ford was
quick (one year) relative to Alaska. In Alaska, an
investment will not yield oil for four or five years. So
even with a greater government-take in Eagle Ford, the
project would be viewed as more attractive because of the
shorter investment time.
Co-Chair Austerman appreciated the information, but stated
that a simplified number was often found in government-
take.
3:38:21 PM
Mr. Pulliam appreciated the debate and he understood the
tendency to focus on government-take and IRR. He cautioned
constituents to review the overall set of information.
Co-Chair Austerman joked that he would recommend that his
constituents review the profitability index 12 and the NPV.
Mr. Pulliam agreed and added that shorter times between
investment and production existed in the Lower 48.
3:39:54 PM
Representative Wilson asked Mr. Pulliam for his opinion
regarding the best course of action. Mr. Pulliam replied
that the presentation included a distillation of the
numbers and provided a variety of charts that depicting
different levels of analysis. He stressed that the decision
was not a simple one. He provided an analysis that
companies might look at when observing opportunities. He
was not able to provide a "magic number."
3:43:10 PM
Representative Wilson pointed out slides 15 and 16, column
5 to column 11. She wondered where Alaska wanted to be when
compared to those columns regarding increased production.
Mr. Pulliam replied that the potential in Alaska was less
than Canada. He proposed the North Sea and the Gulf of
Mexico offshore as potential sites for comparison. He
mentioned that the United Kingdom (UK) had struggled with
declining production and recently modified their tax system
by instituting the Brownfield Allowance. The Brownfield
Allowance was similar to GRE.
3:46:34 PM
Representative Gara pointed to slide 16 asked about new
oil. He noted that schools, roads, and other infrastructure
were funded with the revenue from legacy fields. At $120
per barrel, the profitability index was higher than the
other areas listed in the chart. He did not understand the
proposal to lower taxes on legacy fields, yielding a higher
profitability index than other countries.
Mr. Pulliam replied that the analysis was incremental and
included the buy-down on the tax production. He had
questioned the approach and incentive for the metrics of
the analysis. He wondered if the producers looked at the
benefit in the way it was intended. He pointed out that
ACES did not work as the state had intended. Other areas
lacked restrictions encountered in ACES.
Representative Gara saw that the UK protected the revenue
on legacy fields with the higher tax rate while new fields
and expansions had a lower tax rate.
Mr. Pulliam replied that the UK had two basic taxes. Fields
developed prior to 1993 had a higher rate than fields
developed after 1993. Both sets of fields had the
Brownfield Allowance. The allowance was doubled on the
older fields.
Representative Gara questioned the comparison to
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries. He understood that investment
opportunities spanned the world. He wondered why not make
comparisons to the high-tax areas worldwide.
Mr. Pulliam responded that Alaska did look more attractive
than other countries. He mentioned that the areas in slides
15 and 16 were chosen because an increase in investment was
observed with increased prices. He chose the areas because
they were most appropriate and because they were attracting
investment.
3:54:25 PM
Representative Thompson stated that a company may invest $1
billion and expect a 15 percent return on their investment.
He asked how a company would calculate options with the 4
to 5 year wait in Alaska. Mr. Pulliam replied that a faster
production time yielded a higher return and would thus be
more attractive. He stated that government-take, as
depicted in the presentation, was averaged across the
lifecycle of the development.
3:56:36 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 18: "Annual State Revenues and
Producer Cash Flows at $100 West Coast ANS ($2012) 50 MMBO
Alaska Oil Development New Participant in Alaska." He
explained that the graph depicted a hypothetical cash flow
situation under ACES and HCS CSSB 21(RES). The top panel
depicted the producer while the bottom panel depicted the
state.
4:00:40 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 19: "Annual State Revenues and
Producer Cash Flows at $100 West Coast ANS ($2012) 50 MMBO
Alaska Oil Development Incumbent Participant in Alaska."
The buy-down effect was provided initially by the state.
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 20: "Annual Producer Cash Flows
at $100 West Coast ANS (2012) 50 MMBO Alaska Oil
Development." The chart compared the incumbent with the new
participant. The net present value of the new participant
was lower than the net present value under ACES. The
proposed legislation showed similar results for the
incumbent and the new participant. The parity would serve
as an attractive feature for industry.
4:02:18 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 21: "Additional Volumes Need to
Offset Projected Fiscal Impact of HCS CSSB 21(RES) (FY2014
- FY2043)." The last section viewed the tax reduction,
which would cost the state in revenue. The slide addressed
the additional production required to restore the lost tax
revenue.
Co-Chair Stoltze asked for elaboration about fields with
higher royalty payments.
Mr. Pulliam responded with two different royalty rates in
slide 21. He assumed that the new development would qualify
for GRE. He determined that with a 16 royalty development,
the combined effect of production and more oil would lead
to approximately 29 barrels of oil. The amount needed to
develop to cover the projected losses was approximately 500
million per year. Using the per-barrel amount from a new
development would require approximately 500 million barrels
over the next 30 years to bridge the revenue gap. He
understood that 500 million barrels equaled approximately
18 million barrels from new development per year. The
equation amounted to a daily production of between 45 and
50 thousand barrels per day.
4:06:47 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 22: "Testing Reasonableness of
Achieving Breakeven Development Capital Required ($2012)."
He queried whether the production was reasonable to expect.
Slide 22 provided a "reasonableness test" to ascertain the
viability of the plan. The additional annual capital
required was approximately $315 million. He noted that 2012
was $2.4 billion, so the spending increase would equal 13
percent.
4:07:46 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 23: "Estimated Capital Spending
for Exploration and Development Alaska North Slope vs. U.S.
and Worldwide Spending* 2003 - 2012." The slide compared
Alaskan investment to that in other places in the world for
exploration and development spending. He pointed out that
investment outside of Alaska jumped sharply in the recent
years. The spending levels were indexed to a starting point
of one. The graph demonstrated that spending leveled-off
while spending in the rest of the world grew.
4:09:19 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 24: "Testing Reasonableness of
Achieving Breakeven Development Capital Spending Increase
at Worldwide Pace." The chart attempted to answer the
question regarding Alaska spending bridging the gap. In
2003, Alaska had $1 billion in spending and since that
time, worldwide spending increased by 400 percent. He
hypothesized that an additional $1.6 billion would allow
development of 88 billion barrels of oil.
4:10:19 PM
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 25: "Testing Reasonableness of
Achieving Breakeven Gerking, et al. Study of Sensitivity of
Drilling to Tax Rates." He mentioned a study performed by
economists in the early 2000s viewing the relationship
between severance tax rates, production and drilling. The
analysis was applied to Wyoming. A simulated doubling of
the tax showed that drilling would decline by 23 percent.
Production would not decline as a result of the change in
taxes. He noted that new wells in Wyoming bring on
approximately 25 barrels per day so the addition of the new
wells did not impact new production. The increase in taxes
on production that was already occurring from existing
investments was not as great. The study showed that the
impact on new wells was large.
Mr. Pulliam presented a similar study here in Alaska with
the 10 percent change in the tax rate, which would amount
to a 40 percent change in drilling starts or 24 new wells.
A typical well would produce approximately 67 million
barrels. He admitted that the study was old and that the
drilling relationship between Wyoming and Alaska was
different.
4:14:32 PM
Mr. Pulliam continued with slide 26: "Testing
Reasonableness of Achieving Breakeven Development
Relationship between Drilling Increases and Expected
Barrels Developed Annually." He opined that the changes
proposed in HCS CSSB 21(RES) would send the right message
to investors about the willingness to be competitive while
offering the expected returns.
Mr. Pulliam discussed slide 27: "HCS CSSB 21(RES) Per-
Barrel Credits for Non-GRE Volumes Stepped Scale v.
Smoothed Scale." He explained that the graph depicted the
stepped scale nature of the credit offered in HCS CSSB
21(RES). He suggested a straight linear function as an
alternative that would eliminate the abrupt changes and
might be more appealing.
Co-Chair Austerman asked whether the stair step gave a
definitive tax rate. Mr. Pulliam answered that the stair
step would require oil price analysis. He noted that the
tax credit would change at every $10 increment. If a
straight linear function were employed, the credit would be
more fluid, while remaining simple to model and plan for.
He thought that the elimination of abrupt changes would
provide a more stable system with less opportunity for
disputes in an auditing process.
4:19:28 PM
Representative Thompson understood the break-even point and
asked if the projected 6 percent decline in legacy
production was taken into account.
Mr. Pulliam relayed that the forecast projected a decline.
He supposed that the proposed rate would stem the decline.
Representative Gara asked if the decline rate was lower
than expected, would the number of barrels required to make
up for the loss be larger. He wondered if the revenue
difference between HCS CSSB 21(RES) and ACES would be
larger as a result of a lower decline rate. Mr. Pulliam
replied in the affirmative.
Representative Gara asked about slide 22 and the assumption
of the need to invest an additional $315 million per year
and the $18 lifting cost. He wondered if the lifting cost
was reasonable for the remaining oil on the North Slope.
Mr. Pulliam answered that the lifting cost might be
greater, but he found that the up-front development cost
was consistent with other Alaska development costs.
Representative Gara asked if Mr. Pulliam was referencing
new fields. Mr. Pulliam concurred.
4:22:27 PM
Representative Gara pointed to slide 23 and asked about
years 2007-2012 on Alaska capital investment, which
displayed expenditures that had increased very little. He
noted that DOR cited that capital expenditures had
increased by over 100 percent or $1.5 billion to $3.8
billion. He expressed curiosity about the data presented.
Mr. Pulliam replied that he used data provided by DOR.
Representative Gara cited slide 24 and Alaska capital
spending shown at $2.4 billion, while the committee
received the figure $3.8 billion from DOR. Mr. Pulliam
disagreed.
4:24:43 PM
RECESSED
6:10:44 PM
RECONVENED
JANEK MAYER, MANAGER, UPSTREAM, PFC ENERGY, introduced
himself and provided information about the firm. He
initiated a PowerPoint presentation titled "House Finance
Committee Alaska Fiscal System Discussion Slides April 6,
2013" (copy on file). He noted that his company advised
about oil and gas issues with a focus on macroeconomics,
oil market forecasting, global gas supply and demand,
competitive strategies and other key above ground issues.
The terms set by a government's fiscal regimes were his
area of expertise.
Co-Chair Stoltze asked about Mr. Mayer's length of
engagement with the Alaska legislature and its oil and gas
issues. Mr. Mayer replied that he spent the last several
years addressing oil and gas regime issues, and began
working in Alaska last year for the entire session.
Co-Chair Stoltze pointed out that Mr. Mayer was under
contract with LB&A for service with the legislature. He
noted that PFC had accompanied the legislature through
various iterations of the issue. Mr. Mayer agreed.
6:15:18 PM
Mr. Mayer moved to slide 2 titled "ACES: Key Issues."
· High Government Take and high degree of progressivity
means uncompetitive for investment at current prices
· High marginal rates mean little incentive for producer
efficiency
· "Buydown" effect means incremental and standalone
economics very different - with very different impacts
for incumbent vs new producer
· Credits create significant downside exposure to state
in low price environments, for high cost projects, and
projects not on state lands
· Large scale gas sales would reduce taxes on oil
· Complex system, with often counter-intuitive effects
Mr. Mayer discussed various calculations under ACES and HCS
CSSB 21(RES). He addressed fundamental problems under the
ACES tax system. He communicated the issues in ACES related
to the levels and structure of progressivity. He discussed
a question of magnitude relating to progressivity noting
that Alaska's government take was relatively high. He
stressed that Alaska failed to be competitive for
investment. He stated that the basic structure of
progressivity as defined by ACES created a series of other
problems. He furthered that there were counterintuitive
effects; the economics for a project for a new development
could be very different. He expounded that credits under
the ACES system created a significant downside exposure to
state in low price environments for both high cost projects
and projects not on state lands. He pointed to large scale
gas sales that would reduce taxes on oil and a complex
system, with often counter-intuitive effects.
6:20:16 PM
Mr. Mayer moved to slide 3 titled "Regime Competitiveness -
$80/bbl." The graph depicted the average government take of
global fiscal regimes at $80/bbl. The view modeled by PFC
displayed a very broad range of fiscal regimes around the
world. The yellow bars represented OECD countries. He
explained that the countries with the lowest government-
take had the least resource representation and offered the
lower level to incentivize investment. The top of the chart
displayed countries with large resource opportunities. For
an existing producer, at $80/bbl with ACES the government-
take was approximately 65 percent. He added that ACES
government-take for a new producer was higher, from 69 and
72 percent. An incumbent producer could buy down their tax
rate through spending or investment, whereas a new
developer received the benefit of a 25 percent net
operating loss credit versus the higher buy-down effect.
Both the incumbent and new producer were eligible for the
20 percent capital credit. He added that new units on the
North Slope occurred with a 16.7 percent royalty.
6:24:40 PM
Mr. Mayer turned to slide 4 titled "Regime Competitiveness
- $100/bbl." The graph depicted the average government-take
of global fiscal regimes at $100/bbl. At the price, Alaska
had the second highest levels of government-take in the
OECD, with ACES for new development at a 16.7 percent
royalty directly under Norway. He skipped to slide 6:
"Government Take Competitiveness - Most Relevant Competitor
Regimes." The chart offered a different method of
comparison.
Representative Holmes stated that the version in the packet
was different from the one on the screen. Co-Chair Stoltze
requested further definition as well.
Mr. Mayer further explained the different prices related to
government-take as displayed in the chart. He explained
that the steep slope displayed by ACES resulted from the
progressivity feature. By comparison, other regimes tended
to be regressive, because the royalty rates were fixed. All
fixed royalty regimes were inherently regressive. He added
that the UK and Australia had profit based regimes, with
systems similar to ACES minus the progressivity.
Representative Gara asked about tax rates for new and
existing oil producers. He understood that the UK had two
separate tax rates. He asked if the depiction of UK on
slide 4 encompassed a blending of the two different tax
rates. Mr. Mayer replied that the UK, as displayed on slide
4, did not account for the Brownfield Allowance. The data
displayed in the chart resulted from existing projects.
6:31:27 PM
Representative Gara pointed to slide 4 where the
government-take for existing producers at $100/bbl. He
asked about investment in non-OECD countries like Russia
and Venezuela and wondered why Mr. Mayer focused primarily
on OECD countries. Mr. Mayer replied that the three major
oil companies with investments on the North Slope also had
investments in other non-OECD countries. He explained that
extraordinary resource companies sometimes attracted the
investment that justified the high level of government-
take. He added that the United States was declining in oil
production five years ago because investment was directed
to places like the deep water of Angola. A reversal of the
trend had occurred recently and investment in the Lower 48
had risen. He noted that the Lower 48 was now the greatest
competitor with Alaska.
6:34:19 PM
Representative Gara asked for confirmation that while shale
gas production had increased dramatically in the Lower 48,
conventional oil production had not increased. Mr. Mayer
responded that he would check the overall numbers, but knew
of many conventional plays that had seen significant
increases in the Lower 48.
Representative Wilson asked if the committee would address
SB 23. Co-Chair Stoltze replied in the affirmative.
6:36:41 PM
Representative Kawasaki asked if there were other metrics
that could be used to show comparisons aside from
government-take. With the data provided, he asked why areas
such as Ireland and New Zealand were not experiencing major
production, since the government-take was so low. Mr. Mayer
replied that there were multiple metrics to consider apart
from government-take. He elaborated that the work presented
by Mr. Pulliam allowed information from a wider range of
metrics. He responded that a balance was sought between the
quality of a country's resource base and the level of
government-take sustained. He stated that Ireland had few
resources and the lower level of government take might
encourage exploration.
Representative Kawasaki discussed Mr. Pulliam's statement
that policy makers should view metrics other than
government take when making decisions about tax regimes. He
requested a comparison of resource bases or profitability
in the various global regimes.
Mr. Mayer recommended viewing the information presented by
Mr. Pulliam. He agreed that the balance between the broad
metrics was important. He explained that he presented the
chart because the information was easily grasped and
understood.
6:40:39 PM
Mr. Mayer turned to slide 7 titled "ACES: Key Issues."
· High Government Take and high degree of progressivity
means uncompetitive for investment at current prices
· High marginal rates mean little incentive for producer
efficiency
· "Buydown" effect means incremental and standalone
economics very different - with very different impacts
for incumbent vs new producer
· Credits create significant downside exposure to state
in low price environments, for high cost projects, and
projects not on state lands
· Large scale gas sales would reduce taxes on oil
· Complex system, with often counter-intuitive effects.
Mr. Mayer continued with slide 8 titled "ACES: Average and
Marginal Production Tax Rates." The graph displayed the
comparison between average and marginal tax rates
illustrating the sharp increase in the marginal rate with
an increase in the price of oil. With the higher marginal
tax rate, there was very little market price signal from
movements in the oil price. Producers in Alaska see very
little benefit from increases in oil prices.
6:43:58 PM
Mr. Mayer continued to address slide 8. There was little
incentive to create spending efficiency. Accounting for
costs related to tax was the "heart" of a profit based
taxation system. Taxing the gross value was far less
efficient, but taxing profits required adjustments for
costs.
6:47:13 PM
Mr. Mayer continued to discuss slide 8. He stated that ACES
incentivized spending, but not cost control, which then
disincentivized new spending needed to increase production.
He suggested a hypothetical tax rate with a steep
progressive slope. He argued that new investment would be
nonexistent without the tax incentive in the hypothetical
situation. He added that in the situation, the marginal
benefit of every dollar spent became enormous. He compared
the difference between spending on short term interests in
a mature basin versus making an investment decision.
6:51:02 PM
Mr. Mayer looked at slide 9 briefly, which had been
introduced initially by Mr. Pulliam. The slide illustrated
a calculation of ACES tax and additional capital spending.
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 10: "ACES - Key Issues."
· High Government Take and high degree of progressivity
means uncompetitive for investment at current prices
· High marginal rates mean little incentive for producer
efficiency
· "Buydown" effect means incremental and standalone
economics very different - with very different impacts
for incumbent vs new producer
· Credits create significant downside exposure to state
in low price environments, for high cost projects, and
projects not on state lands
· Large scale gas sales would reduce taxes on oil
· Complex system, with often counter-intuitive effects
Mr. Mayer discussed the graphs on slide 11: "ACES - $18/bbl
Capex New Development, Standalone." He pointed out the
graph in the upper-left quadrant of the graph, which
depicted a range of government-take at different oil
prices. The top level of the bars indicated the total level
of government-take. The colored bars indicated the
different components of the regime that constitute
government-take. The data showed that the royalty in ACES
was indeed regressive. He added the highly progressive
nature of the Profit Based Production Tax (PPT), which was
the key component of ACES.
Mr. Mayer continued with slide 11 and the graph in the
upper-right quadrant showing a split of net present value
of production. The graph illustrated new development on a
standalone basis. The data showed a shallow line for the
company due to the impact of progressivity, compared to a
steep line for the state.
6:56:02 PM
Mr. Mayer continued with slide 11 and the graph located in
the lower-left quadrant. The graph depicted a cash flow
analysis at $100/bbl. The green bars illustrated revenue
from a project. The other colored bars depicted the costs
associated with production. The after-tax cash flow line
often determined the economic attractiveness of the project
to the producer along with all of the different economic
metrics. Finally, he pointed out a quick economic summary
detailed in the lower-left quadrant of the slide for the
hypothetical $18/bbl, 12.5 percent royalty, new
development, standalone project. He opined that ACES was
adopted under the argument of incremental economics. The
fundamental information was the internal rate of return of
the project.
7:00:33 PM
Mr. Mayer compared slide 12: "ACES - $18/bbl Capex New
Development, Incremental to Incumbent" with slide 1. When a
project was viewed in a standalone basis, it was analyzed
alone. With the incremental basis view, a project was
analyzed with both the base production portfolio and the
new project in tandem. The base cash flows were subtracted
from the combined cash flows in the incremental basis to
ascertain the changes stemming from new investment. He
corrected an error in the slide noting that the word
standalone did not belong in the title.
7:02:54 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 12 and noted effects of the
marginal tax rate. He stated that the peak in the marginal
tax rate had an effect on the overall value to the project.
The company lost money with the increase in oil prices,
while the state benefitted. He mentioned the high internal
rates of return, which warranted further investigation of
marginal versus standalone economics.
7:07:47 PM
Representative Gara pointed to decreasing oil production in
major oil producing states in the Lower 48. Mr. Mayer would
answer the question later.
Representative Gara looked at slide 8 and asked if
companies in Alaska paid approximately 37 percent in
production tax. He asked if the rate provided was prior to
deductions and credits. Mr. Mayer replied that the rate
provided was after deductions but before credits. He
thought that including credits in the calculations would
show even higher government support for spending.
Representative Gara asked about slide 8 and the "upper
line." He asked if the data included the lower rate paid
for credits. Mr. Mayer concurred and added that credits
would reduce the tax rate.
Representative Costello clarified that the return on the
capital employed was the decision that drove investment.
Mr. Mayer replied that the return on the capital was the
way that large oil and gas companies benchmarked their
performance to demonstrate it to the market. He added that
small oil and gas companies were focused on growth, while
large oil and gas companied focused on efficiency.
7:12:11 PM
Representative Costello pointed to the buydown effect on
the overall system. Since HCS CSSB 21(RES) eliminated the
ability to buydown, she asked about the significance of the
action versus the progressivity factor. Mr. Mayer replied
that the progressivity and the ability to buydown were
inextricably linked. He noted that progressivity created
the buydown effect, under the ACES structure. The buydown
would not exist with the same progressivity based on the
price of oil rather than production value. The level of a
company's spending would determine the tax base rather than
tax rate. He opined that the buydown aspect in ACES did not
help sanction a difficult project. He opined that the
project must have attractive economics on a standalone
basis.
7:14:20 PM
Representative Wilson asked what the committee should do
and the reason why.
Mr. Mayer replied that a more neutral system that did not
artificially create results, but instead created a simple
and predictable tax regime that was competitive overall. He
believed that HCS CSSB 21(RES) went a long way in achieving
the goal. He noted that the different versions of the bill
had a more neutral tax rate. He pointed out that results
were more difficult to evaluate under the ACES regime
because of the progressivity. When he modeled results under
HCS CSSB 21(RES), he was able to relate them to different
scenarios that made sense.
7:17:07 PM
Representative Munoz noted that the last presentation
yielded data that Alaska was less competitive with new
participation categories. She requested comment and asked
what aspect encouraged investment. Mr. Mayer responded that
the structure of HCS CSSB 21(RES) presented a fundamental
difference when a project was viewed on a standalone basis
versus when viewed in an incremental basis in a portfolio
of an existing producer. Using HCS CSSB 21(RES), the basic
economics were identical.
7:19:36 PM
Representative Gara reported to the committee that Conoco
Phillips stated publically the good rates of return in
Alaska for the incumbent fields. He wondered if ACES with
altered levels of progressivity might be more attractive.
He asked about following Mr. Mayer's advice for a lower
rate on new fields and proposed that government-takes would
be somewhere near the middle.
Mr. Mayer responded that the government-take was not the
most important method of analyzing a new producer. The
artificial rates of manufacturing high internal rates of
return through buydown created undesirable side effects. He
advocated for a simpler, cleaner structure.
7:22:00 PM
Mr. Mayer moved to slide 13: "ACES - Key Issues."
· High Government Take and high degree of progressivity
means uncompetitive for investment at current prices
· High marginal rates mean little incentive for producer
efficiency
· "Buydown" effect means incremental and standalone
economics very different - with very different impacts
for incumbent vs new producer
· Credits create significant downside exposure to state
in low price environments, for high cost projects, and
projects not on state lands
· Large scale gas sales would reduce taxes on oil
· Complex system, with often counter-intuitive effects
7:23:08 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 14: "ACES - $25/bb Capex New
Development, Incremental to Incumbent." The model utilized
the base and new production while subtracting the economics
of the base to arrive at the incremental result. He pointed
out the overall split of net present value of production.
"At $75/bbl oil, the Net Present Value (NPV) of state
spending on credits is higher than the NPV of all state
government take for the project. However, the project still
generated positive NPV for the company - a major concern
for liability to the state." The price value presented
total positive value to the company. The effect of the
buydown was lower to the state than to the company, so the
company was able to continue to generate NPV at the price.
Representative Holmes asked about the subtitles in the
presentation. Mr. Mayer repeated his apology about the use
of "standalone" in the subtitle.
Mr. Mayer continued that the data representing total
government-take included the federal corporate income tax.
7:26:24 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 15: "ACES - $35/bbl Capex New
Development, Incremental to Incumbent." Progressivity as
implemented in ACES created a liability to the state. The
state subsidized the prices. He stressed that government-
take was only a small piece of relevant information, while
other distortions presented in ACES were also important.
7:27:38 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 16: "ACES: Key Issues."
· High Government Take and high degree of progressivity
means uncompetitive for investment at current prices
· High marginal rates mean little incentive for producer
efficiency
· "Buydown" effect means incremental and standalone
economics very different - with very different impacts
for incumbent vs new producer
· Credits create significant downside exposure to state
in low price environments, for high cost projects, and
projects not on state lands
· Large scale gas sales would reduce taxes on oil
· Complex system, with often counter-intuitive effects
Co-Chair Stoltze recalled hearing testimony from other
committees regarding areas paying 16.7 percent royalty. He
wondered if the higher royalty rate made the outlying areas
less competitive. Mr. Mayer replied that a change in the
royalty would upset companies that did not bid on projects
because of the high royalty rate. Co-Chair Stoltze
clarified that the process would not be fair.
Mr. Mayer replied yes. He added that the high royalty did
raise government-take. He suggested that leveling the
playing field could be addressed in the new tax system. He
mentioned that the small producer credit was reintroduced
to HCS CSSB 21(RES) by the resources committee. He argued
that the establishment of the small producer credit in HCS
CSSB 21(RES) was less than ideal and provided incentive for
companies to cease growth beyond the threshold provided.
7:31:42 PM
Mr. Mayer questioned the efficiency of the small producer
credit. Since small producers had the higher royalties, the
GRE might be manipulated to compensate.
7:32:45 PM
Representative Wilson asked if the credits were important.
Mr. Mayer replied that eliminating all the credits was the
governor's initial proposal with SB 21. The flat production
tax rate on top of the royalty created a fundamentally
regressive system. He commented that the flat $5 per barrel
credit provided an incentive for production and balanced
out the regressive nature of the royalty.
7:34:42 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 17: "Impact of Large-Scale Gas
Sales on Tax Rates."
· Under ACES, production tax value is assessed on a
combined BTU-equivalent basis for both oil and gas
production
o So long as no major gas export project is under
development, this has no impact
o In the event of the development of a major gas
export project, however, when gas prices are
significantly lower than oil prices, this could
lead to significant reductions in Government Take
7:35:45 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 18: "ACES: Key Issues."
· High Government Take and high degree of progressivity
means uncompetitive for investment at current prices
· High marginal rates mean little incentive for producer
efficiency
· "Buydown" effect means incremental and standalone
economics very different-with very different impacts
for incumbent vs new producer
· Credits create significant downside exposure to state
in low price environments, for high cost projects, and
projects not on state lands
· Large scale gas sales would reduce taxes on oil
· Complex system, with often counter-intuitive effects
7:36:58 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 19: "ACES and SB 21: Issues and
Aims."
· ACES - Issues
o High Government Take and high degree of
progressivity means uncompetitive for investment
at current prices
o Credits create significant downside exposure to
state in low price environments, for high cost
projects, and projects not on state lands
o "Buydown" effect means incremental and standalone
economics very different - with very different
impacts for incumbent vs new producer
o High marginal rates mean little incentive for
producer efficiency
o Complex system, with often counter-intuitive
effects
· SB21 AIMS
o Relatively neutral at a competitive level of
Government Take, while further improving
competitiveness for new projects
o Limit downside risk to state from credits
o Balance system with even impacts for incumbent vs
new producer
o More neutral regime creates low, constant
marginal rates - strong incentive for producer
efficiency
o Simplify the fiscal system
7:39:41 PM
Mr. Mayer briefly discussed slide 20: "ACES and SB 21: Key
Changes." He noted that the slide presented a high level
analysis of the key changes.
7:40:11 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 21: "ACES and SB 21: Government-
take Comparison Base Production." He stated that the graph
depicted three different iterations of SB 21 compared to
ACES. He noted that SB 21 removed the capital credits
leaving a regressive structure. The aim of CSSB 21 was to
create a neutral system, by eliminating the regressive
nature and raising the base rate to 35 percent and adding
the $5 per barrel credit. He stated that CSSB 21 created
sufficient progressivity to counteract the regressive
nature of the royalty.
7:43:18 PM
Mr. Mayer noted that HCS CSSB 21(RES) used the basic
structure and increased the credits to further reduce
government take at the low end without creating an impact
at $100/bbl level.
7:44:10 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 22: "ACES and SB 21: Government-
take Comparison $18/bbl New Development, Standalone." He
pointed out the difference between the finance and the
House resources version of SB 21. The reduction in
government-take was due to the incorporation of the small
producer tax credit. The credit was a fixed amount and had
a greater impact at low prices than high prices and
substantially reduced the overall level of government take.
7:46:02 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 24: " ACES and SB 21: Government-
take Comparison $18/bbl New Development, Standalone." The
graph depicted marginal and average rates for HCS CSSB
21(RES). The basic structure of HCS CSSB 21(RES) was a flat
rate of either 33 or 35 percent across all prices. The $5
per barrel credit applied brought the average rate down as
prices decreased. He opined that the flat marginal rate
provided incentives for new producers and incumbents.
7:47:41 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 25: "Linear Function for Credit
may be preferable to Step Function." He pointed out that an
impact of the step function was the creation of sudden
spikes every $10 due to credits. He noted that Mr. Pulliam
suggested a linear credit as an alternative.
7:48:24 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 26: "Credits - NOL, Exploration
and Small Producer."
· Impact of ACES on project economics is very different
for an incumbent vs a new producer
o At current prices, incumbent experiences impact
of "buydown" effect, with new spending reducing
tax rate from levels above 25 percent NOL credit
(plus also impact of capital credit)
o New producer receives only impact of 25 percent
NOL credit (plus capital credit)
· Fully monetizable NOL credit for small producers evens
this playing field
o All producers receive effective 33 percent
government support for spending, whether new or
incumbent
ƒFlat, low marginal rate maintains strong
incentive for efficiencies and cost control
ƒNo undue exposure to the state from higher
cost projects at low prices
· Aim is to even the playing field and limit the level
of support for exploration as well as other forms of
spending
o Allowing the Exploration credit to sunset, but
having the fully monetizable 33 percent NOL
credit means 33 percent government support for
exploration spending
o again, even impact between incumbent vs new
producer
· When the impacts of the system are even between
incumbent vs new producer, strong argument that
extending "small producer" credit is less warranted
· Overall impact is to significantly simplify the system
7:49:31 PM
Mr. Mayer discussed slide 27: "Government-take
Competitiveness." He explained that the arrows on the left
depicted the new development incorporating the impact of
the small producer tax credit. Without the impact of the
small producer tax credit, a couple of percentage points of
government take could be added.
7:50:56 PM
Co-Chair Stoltze asked if the information presented by PFC
Energy could be shared in legislator's newsletters. Mr.
Mayer replied yes.
Representative Wilson asked about series one, two, three
and four. Mr. Mayer replied that the chart was not properly
labeled. He extended his apologies.
7:52:00 PM
Representative Edgmon asked if more investment had occurred
in the North Slope under ACES, would the presentation be
different. Mr. Mayer replied that structural problems
involved in ACES along with the overall level of
government-take were the premises of his presentation. His
presentation would remain consistent about the structural
issues in ACES. He added that the last five years, under
ACES provided compelling evidence for Alaska.
Representative Edgmon mentioned the great emphasis placed
on government-take in the last two presentations with the
caveat that oil companies used other metrics when making
business decisions. He wondered if the committee would
receive further information for use in their decision
making process.
Mr. Mayer responded that a focus on government-take was
important, but did not provide the whole picture. He
attempted to present a range of metrics while comparing
regimes.
7:56:05 PM
Representative Edgmon asked if the committee could expect
to gain additional information to effectively benchmark the
reasons behind the low investment. Co-Chair Stoltze
discussed a Saturday Night Live skit.
Representative Gara asked about slide 21. He recalled that
Pedro Van Meurs advocated for a 72 percent government-take.
Mr. Mayer stated that the decision rested in the hands of
the policy makers. He agreed that 72 percent government-
take was reasonable for maintenance of legacy production
along its current decline. If the legislature wished for
substantial new investment in the legacy fields, then an
incentive must be provided.
8:01:28 PM
Representative Gara asked if government-take could be
increased to 65 percent under a new tax system, while
offering similar incentives to industry. Mr. Mayer replied
that the price of oil was the issue. When competing for new
investment, a higher government-take was not competitive.
Representative Gara asked if the state could collect a
better share when oil was above $110 per barrel. Mr. Mayer
replied that policy makers could determine the answer. He
noted that HCS CSSB 21(RES) reviewed the neutral Senate
version and modified it to be more progressive.
Co-Chair Stoltze clarified that Mr. Mayer was obligated to
provide information, but not to make policy judgments.
8:03:12 PM
Vice-Chair Neuman pointed out the decline curve faced by
Alaska. He noted that different charts in the presentation
showed the decline curve and the loss of funds of $40
million per day or $1.5 billion per year. He asked if other
countries tended to lower their government-take during
times of declining production.
Mr. Mayer provided the example of Alberta, which made
similar assumptions about a mature basin without taking
into account the high oil prices. He noted that the
increase of lease sales for investment occurred in Alberta.
He added that the UK government raised the government-take
and introduced the ground fuel credit for new development,
which reduced government-take on incremental production
from legacy fields.
8:05:53 PM
Co-Chair Stoltze encouraged committee members to schedule
time with Mr. Mayer. He valued assistance from veterans on
the issue.
CSSB 21(FIN) am(efd fld) was HEARD and HELD in committee
for further consideration.
8:08:30 PM
AT EASE
8:12:10 PM
RECONVENED
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| SB 21 House Finance DNR GRE Presentation_4-6-13.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 21 |
| SB 23 AIDEA - AEA response to HF question.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 23 |
| SB 23 HCS FIN WORKDRAFT R.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 23 |
| SB 23 NEW FN CS(FIN)-DCCED-AIDEA-04-05-13B.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 23 |
| SB 23NEW FN CS(FIN)-DCCED-AIDEA-04-05-13.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 23 |
| Econ One Presentation For House Finance (4-06-13).pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 21 |
| SB 21 Handout Gara Petroleum News.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 21 |
| SB 21 13.04.07 HFIN DOR follow up.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 21 |
| SB 21 PFC HFIN 6 April 2013.pdf |
HFIN 4/6/2013 12:30:00 PM |
SB 21 |